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After several decades of disuse, the Antidumping
Act has been rediscovered in recent years by domestic producers.
However, even as American manufacturers have resorted to the
Act with increasing frequency, they have criticized it as being inef-
fective.' The following comments of Richard P. Simmons, presi-
dent of Allegheny Ludlum, reflect typical criticisms made by do-
mestic producers:
Many of the members of this committee recognize the weak-
ness of the existing law, particularly with regard to the length
of time necessary to prosecute antidumping cases; the fact that
the burden of proving injury after dumping has been estab-
lished is generally difficult; the fact that the Treasury Depart-
ment can broaden the scope of the investigation to include prod-
ucts or product sizes not included by the petitioner; the fact that
the petitioner does not have access to the facts used by the
Treasury Department in making its determination; and while
there are many other weaknesses in the existing law-the fact
that penalties are imposed far too late to provide relief to com-
panies and employees, who by this time have been injured for
well over a year at the shortest.2
Although American producers undoubtedly would be better served
if the Antidumping Act were to be amended in response to these
criticisms, the Act, as presently written and administered by the
Treasury Department, can even now provide benefits for domestic
producers that are frequently overlooked.
An American manufacturer who initiates a proceeding under the
Antidumping Act is usually seeking to force up prices for imported
goods that compete with his own products, to reduce the flow of com-
peting imported merchandise into his traditional domestic market
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areas, or both. If the facts are right-that is, if the manufacturer can
win his dumping proceeding, and if the manufacturer's injuries are
sufficiently severe to justify the significant time and expense re-
quired to bring the proceeding to a successful conclusion, then the
manufacturer will usually achieve his goals.
In addition, the manufacturer will usually begin to derive benefits
from the Antidumping Act long before the dumping proceeding is
concluded. Furthermore, the Antidumping Act is frequently prefer-
able to other options open to the manufacturer for combating import
competition.
INTERIM AND LONG-TERM BENEFITS TO DOMESTIC PRODUCERS
Assuming a winning case, which results in favorable action by the
governmental agencies involved at all stages of an antidumping pro-
ceeding, the procedures and interim events that occur in the course
of the proceeding can have a chilling effect on the importation of
low-priced foreign merchandise long before dumping duties are fi-
nally assessed or collected.
Thirty days after a domestic manufacturer's dumping complaint
is received by the Treasury Department in acceptable form, the De-
partment publishes an Antidumping Proceeding Notice which sig-
nals the commencement of a full scale dumping investigation. 3 Up
to this point, the foreign producers and importers of the merchan-
dise identified in the Notice have not yet become formally involved
in the proceeding. However, the Department's commencement of an
antidumping investigation usually receives wide publicity in trade
circles, and publication of the Notice frequently results in a slow-
down of import volume and firming of prices for the foreign mer-
chandise. This is because foreign producers and importers look
ahead to the issue that will arise later in the dumping proceeding as
to whether their activities have injured domestic industry. Typi-
cally, they attempt to neutralize the domestic manufacturer's inevit-
able accusation that they have been engaging in predatory pricing
and marketing practices.
The investigation undertaken by the Treasury Department after
publication of the initial Notice draws the foreign producers and im-
porters into the mainstream of the proceeding. 4 Departmental and
Bureau of Customs investigators pry into pricing and marketing
practices of the foreign producers and importers. Customers may be
contacted. Foreign producers and importers must complete lengthy
and detailed questionnaires prepared by the Bureau, and provide
backup sales and shipment documentation, frequently on short no-
tice. If the investigation is based upon alleged below-cost selling by
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the foreign producers, 5 the investigators will also require foreign pro-
ducers to divulge their production costs to United States government
officials. The Freedom of Information Act 6 prevents the Treasury
Department from giving meaningful assurances that this highly con-
fidential data will be kept from the foreign producers' American com-
petitors. Should importers and foreign producers refuse to cooperate
in the investigation, they face the risk that the Treasury Department
will reach a determination on the basis of such information as is
available.7 This may well be the very materials provided by the com-
plaining American manufacturer to establish whether less than fair
value (hereinafter LTFV) sales have occurred. Obviously, such infor-
mation is likely to support the domestic manufacturer's complaint.
The sensitivity of the information sought by the investigators, the
burden of compiling data requested by them, the general strains and
scrutiny of the investigative process, and the stigma that flows from
being labeled as having dumped often lead foreign producers and
importers to begin considering means of settling the dumping com-
plaint of the American manufacturer and terminating the investiga-
tion, e.g., by price assurances to the Treasury Department.8
Within six months after the Treasury Department commences its
full scale investigation (unless the Department extends the period to
nine months due to the complexity of the case), the Department pub-
lishes a Withholding of Appraisement Notice.9 The Notice contains
Treasury's tentative determination of sales at less than fair value
and sets forth the dumping margins that have been tentatively
found. It directs Customs officials throughout the United States to
withhold appraisement on all shipments of the merchandise identi-
fied in the Notice thereafter arriving in this country, and requires the
importers thereof to post bonds to cover future possible dumping
duties on all shipments arriving after the Notice is published.' 0 Thus,
if the merchandise in question is later found to have been dumped,
importers become vulnerable to the imposition of dumping duties
retroactive to the date when the Withholding of Appraisement Notice
is published. Since importers are precluded from passing on dumping
duties to their customers," the combination of the retroactive risk
feature embodied in the withholding of appraisements, the require-
ment that bonds be posted to cover dumping duties, and the identifi-
cation of potential dumping margins in the Treasury Department's
Withholding of Appraisement Notice results, in almost all cases, in a
dramatic and immediate drop in imports, an increase in import
prices, or both, at the time the Notice is published.
Furthermore, if the procurement of the foreign merchandise in-
volves any lead time, domestic prices may be expected to firm prior
to, and in anticipation of, the publication of the Withholding of Ap-
praisement Notice. Appraisements are withheld on all goods entering
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the United States after the Notice is published-even those ordered
well in advance of such publication. The longer the lead time be-
tween order and delivery of imported merchandise, the sooner the
threat of publication of the Withholding of Appraisement Notice is
likely to be felt in the marketplace. For example, in the case of goods
requiring a four-month lead time, import orders may be expected to
begin falling off as early as two months after the Treasury Depart-
ment commences its investigation.
12
Within three months after publishing the Withholding of Appraise-
ment Notice, Treasury makes its final Determination of LTFV Sales
confirming its tentative finding. 13 It then refers the case to the ITC for
a determination as to whether a domestic industry is being or is likely
to be injured as a result of the importation of the merchandise in
question at less than fair value. The ITC must make its injury deter-
mination within three months, after which Treasury publishes a for-
mal dumping finding and begins assessing dumping duties retroac-
tive to the date of the publication of the Withholding of Appraisement
Notice. 14 However, in most cases, the complaining American manu-
facturer has by then realized the benefits of the Antidumping Act for
six months, as discussed above. Further, dumping duties assessed
and collected by Treasury typically are small, compared with the ten-
tative dumping margins earlier announced by the Department. This is
because importers have raised prices to avoid dumping duties, or for-
eign producers have decided to seek other, friendlier markets.
Although American manufacturers have bitterly charged the Trea-
sury Department with failing to assess or collect dumping duties, 15
affirmative dumping findings have been effective weapons against
LTFV imports. Moreover, dumping findings tend to remain effective
for many years. At the time this article was written, findings dating
back to the early 1960s were still extant.' 6
DETERRENTS TO USING THE ANTIDUMPING ACT
Despite the benefits flowing from a successful dumping case, rela-
tively few complaints under the Antidumping Act have been filed in
the past by American manufacturers. There are several reasons for
the traditional reluctance.
Legitimate Price Competition versus Dumping
Not all sales of imported merchandise at prices which undercut
those of competing domestic products are at less than fair value, so
as to be actionable under the Antidumping Act. Dumping involves
price discrimination across international borders-the sale of foreign
merchandise in the United States at prices below its home market
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prices for the same merchandise (or, if sales at home are below cost,
at prices less than cost of production plus general expenses and
profit). Thus, dumping occurs when a foreign producer undersells
himself in this country, not necessarily when he undersells an
American manufacturer of the same product. The Antidumping Act
does not provide a remedy for an American manufacturer whose prod-
ucts are being undersold by a more efficient foreign producer.
By the same token, if a domestic manufacturer is not sufficiently
cost-competitive, even if the foreign producer were to be required
under the Antidumping Act to sell in the United States at fair value,
the resultant elimination of dumping margins may not erase or suffi-
ciently narrow the price differential between the domestic and for-
eign goods so as to enable the domestic manufacturer to compete
effectively with the imports. In the context of a dumping proceeding,
this phenomenon surfaces if competitive margins by which foreign
goods are underselling their domestic counterparts significantly ex-
ceed the dumping margins found by the Treasury Department. When
this occurs, importing interests frequently and successfully argue
that LTFV sales have not injured domestic industry.
Remoteness of Injury from Remedy
A dumping case takes thirteen months from the time a domestic
manufacturer files a complaint with the Treasury Department to the
promulgation of a formal dumping finding by the Department follow-
ing an injury determination by the ITC. As noted earlier, the Treasury
Department may extend a complex case by an additional three
months. 17 To this period must be added the time that an aggrieved
domestic manufacturer must expend preparing and compiling mate-
rial for an effective dumping complaint.' 8 If the domestic manufac-
turer plans to rely upon section 205(b) of the Act (sales below cost in
the country of origin), the investigative work and economic research
needed to substantiate such a claim may consume a year or more.' 9
Thus, as domestic producers frequently note, the remoteness between
the time of injury and the imposition of dumping duties under the Act
can be a very real problem, even though the benefits of the Act often
accrue months before a formal dumping finding is published.
Cost
The out-of-pocket costs to a domestic manufacturer who initiates a
dumping proceeding are substantial-frequently well in excess of six
figures. This is ironic. The Antidumping Act empowers the Secretary
of the Treasury to commence a dumping investigation on his own
initiative if he has reason to believe that foreign merchandise is
120 o Antidumping Law
being sold to this country at less than fair value. 20 Moreover, the Act
does not require an injured domestic producer to initiate a dumping
complaint or to become involved in a dumping proceeding if he files
a complaint. 21 In practice, however, the Treasury Department has
refused to initiate dumping investigations on its own motion, on the
theory that if a domestic producer has not been sufficiently injured
by dumping practices to file a complaint, injury to domestic industry
probably does not exist. Moreover, the Department encourages active
participation by interested domestic parties, and in the past has re-
quested them, for example, to submit legal briefs refuting points
raised by the importing interests in the course of a dumping proceed-
ing. Departmental proceedings are usually held in Washington, D.C.,
which may compound costs for injured domestic producers located in
the hinterlands. The end result is that the same domestic producers
who must suffer injury before they have standing to complain under
the Antidumping Act-as administered by the Treasury Depart-
ment-must incur substantial costs in order to have those injuries
redressed, even though the Act would allow the Treasury Depart-
ment to avoid this anomaly.
Disruption of Internal Operations
A domestic manufacturer must make a major commitment of com-
pany personnel if he intends to submit an effective complaint initiat-
ing a dumping proceeding and to participate effectively in the dump-
ing case which follows. Knowledgeable company officials are needed
to compile and analyze the data establishing injury to the domestic
manufacturer, to document the less than fair' value import activities
in question (at least to a sufficient extent to induce the Treasury De-
partment to proceed with a formal investigation), to analyze the work
product of expert witnesses and the defenses raised by the importers
and foreign producers in the proceeding, and to complete question-
naires and compile data requested by the Treasury Department. The
involvement of internal personnel in dumping cases can and does
disrupt ongoing operations, occasionally to a serious extent, especially
when the complaining domestic producer is a small business.
Lack of Damages
In marked contrast to the plaintiff in a private antitrust lawsuit, a
domestic manufacturer who initiates a dumping proceeding that is
ultimately successful does not recover damages, awards, penalties,
attorney's fees, costs, or any other direct form of monetary relief if
and when a dumping finding is made. He does not share in dump-
ing duties collected from the foreign producer, and receives no
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recompense for his time and efforts. His sole "award" is the reduced
import activity and increased import prices.
Difficulty of Proving Injury
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, complaining domestic manu-
facturers frequently have experienced great difficulty convincing the
ITC that LTFV sales of foreign merchandise in the United States have
injured domestic industry. There are numerous legal and practical
obstacles to proving injury. For example, domestic industry must
demonstrate a causal link between import sales at less than fair value
and the alleged injury. If an American manufacturer is beset by prob-
lems, other than LTFV imports, which adversely affect its profits or
capacity utilization rates, or if the manufacturer is not cost-competi-
tive, the Antidumping Act will not afford relief. Moreover, the Act
requires injury to an "industry"-an American manufacturer experi-
encing operating losses while domestic competitors are showing pro-
fits must look beyond the Antidumping Act for assistance. There are
problems in defining the industry in question, and it is not always
clear whether the ITC will equate injury to a regional industry with
injury to "an industry" under the Act. Uncertainty also exists as to the
degree of injury that must be shown; on some occasions, the ITC
appears to require material injury, but at other times, any injury more
than de minimis will suffice. The published ITC injury determina-
tions are unreliable as precedent, since a given decision is merely
reflective of a majority vote of the Commission members then sitting,
and no single Commissioner seems to regard himself as bound by prior
decisions of other past or present Commissioners.
The historic reluctance of the ITC and its predecessor, the United
States Tariff Commission, to find injury is a frequently discussed
topic among practitioners familiar with the Antidumping Act. In
fact, for many decades, domestic manufacturers have viewed the
Commission as strongly favoring free trade and as regarding the Act
as a symbol for protectionism. This fear has been especially preva-
lent when a majority of incumbent Commission members were ap-
pointees of a Democratic president. However accurate, the very exis-
tence of this perception has discouraged domestic manufacturers
from initiating dumping cases.
THE ANTIDUMPING ACT VERSUS OTHER REMEDIES
Opponents of the Antidumping Act have suggested that private anti-
trust actions and import relief provisions under the Trade Act of 1974
provide viable substitutes for the Antidumping Act.2 2 I believe, how-
ever, that the Antidumping Act is preferable to these alternatives.
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As costly and time-consuming as a dumping proceeding may be,
such costs and time are dwarfed by the enormous expenses and
many years required to commence and win a private antitrust action,
even against domestic defendants. The fact that the potential defen-
dant in such antitrust litigation would be an overseas producer-
most of whose records and personnel are located thousands of miles
away, who communicates in a language other than English, and
who likely maintains business records in accordance with practices
unfamiliar to United States courts-would vastly compound the time
and expense required to see such antitrust litigation through to a
successful conclusion. Difficulties involved in discovery-obtaining
documentation to substantiate antitrust claims as well as the sworn
testimony of key witnesses-would be formidable. Moreover, an
American manufacturer contemplating a private antitrust action
would face serious problems in proving the requisite intent by the
foreign defendants, either under state statutes directed at below-cost
or other predatory sales practices or under federal antitrust law. In
the Gilmore case,2 3 a small domestic steel manufacturer initiated a
dumping proceeding against the five largest Japanese steel pro-
ducers and their related trading companies; the proceeding was ulti-
mately successful. However, it would have been almost inconceiv-
able for Gilmore to have undertaken a private antitrust battle against
these foreign giants. Moreover, if Gilmore had done so, the result
which it obtained in approximately eighteen months (five months
preparation plus thirteen months of proceedings) utilizing the Anti-
dumping Act today would still be many years from realization.
Other import relief measures embodied in the Trade Act of 1974
likewise present poor alternatives to the Antidumping Act-assum-
ing that an antidumping proceeding could be "won". Ultimately, the
granting of such relief is subject to legislative, administrative, and
presidential discretion.2 4 Although the administration of the Anti-
dumping Act is not entirely free from political pressures, the Act
nonetheless contains relatively clean and clear-cut criteria for isolat-
ing instances of proscribed international price discrimination and for
imposing the resulting duties. This is in marked contrast to relief
measures found in the Trade Act. An American businessman utiliz-
ing the Antidumping Act is invoking a right, embodied in law, to
have his government interdict LTFV sales if injury to domestic in-
dustry can be shown. In contrast, under the Trade Act, a business-
man must seek a dole in Washington, D. C., requesting discretionary
relief or succor from his government. The numerous instances to
date in which the President has denied relief under the Trade Act on
purely discretionary grounds underscore the fact that the protection
afforded by that Act to domestic businesses injured by imports may
well be illusory.
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NOTES
1. Ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. 11
(1921), as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-73 (1976). I do not here
attack or defend the Antidump-
ing Act, or advocate changing
it, on policy grounds (but see
Barcel6, The Antidumping
Law: Repeal it or Revise it,
ante; Hemmendinger, The An-
tidumping Act: Proposals for
Change, post). Rather, I view
the Act as it is written and ad-
ministered, and attempt to as-
say its efficacy, in practical
terms, for a United States pro-
ducer facing competition from
imported goods.
2. See American Metal Market,
Oct. 26, 1978, at 18, col. 1.
3. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
4. 19 C.F.R. § 153.31 (1977).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
7. 19 C.F.R. § 153.31(a) (1977).




and foreign producers are an
infrequent occurrence, due to
the parties' concern that an
agreement (or even discus-
sions) between them, as com-
petitors, concerning price lev-
els or import volumes for the
foreign merchandise might vio-
late United States antitrust
laws.
9. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b), (d) (1976).
10. 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.35, 153.48,
153.50, and 153.51 (1977).
11. 19 C.F.R. § 153.49 (1977).
12. However, a temporary reverse
trend must be noted. Occasion-
ally, a flurry of import activity
occurs in the initial stages of a
dumping proceeding, as im-
porters and their United States
customers attempt to build up
inventories before import prices
firm and volumes dwindle. The
same phenomenon has taken
place periodically under the
Trigger Price System; when
higher trigger prices for a sub-
sequent calendar quarter have
been announced by the Trea-
sury Department, import sales
(at the current lower prices)
have escalated temporarily.
13. 19 U.S.C § 160(b)(3) (1976).
14. Id.; 19 C.F.R. § 153.53 (1977).
15. The Japanese TV case is a
glaring example. 19 C.F.R. §
153.46 (1977).
16. 19 C.F.R. § 153.46 (1977).
17. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(2) (1976).
18. 19 C.F.R. § 153.27 (1977).
19. 19 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); 19
C.F.R. §§ 153.25, 153.26
(1977).
21. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
22. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat.
1978 (1975).
23. 42 Fed. Reg. 16,883 (1978).
See Rodriguez, Gilmore: An
Antidumping Action as Cost-
Price Comparison, post.
24. E.g., §§ 202, 223 of the 1974
Trade Act, codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2273 (1976).
